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Abstract – The industrial policy in the UK and in Portugal, as in most EU countries, seeks 
to attract new inward investment capacity, to create jobs and to promote the impact of the 
so-called 'demonstration effect' of 'greenfield' development strategies pursued in the new 
plants of inward investors on existing or 'brownfield' plants. This industrial policy focus is 
particularly evident in the automobile industry. 
This paper compares the industrial policy oriented toward the automobile industry in the 
UK and in Portugal. Two recent 'greenfield' investments are analised: Nissan in the North-
east  region  (UK)  and  Ford/VW  in  the  Setúbal  Peninsula  (Portugal),  as  well  as  three 
'brownfield' plants: Ford Halewood and GM Vauxhall Ellesmere Port in the North West 
region (UK) and Renault in Setúbal (Portugal). The first part starts with a discussion of 
industrial policy in the automobile sector, the role of 'greenfield' development strategies and 
the 'demonstration effect' on 'brownfield' plants. Then, the limits of new inward investment 
are pointed out, basically their problems and restrictions. Afterwards, the structural barriers 
to the 'demonstration effect' within 'brownfield' plants are outlined and some possibilities for 
alternative 'brownfield' development strategies are presented. 
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Resumo – 'GREENFIELDS' E 'BROWNFIELDS': INDÚSTRIA AUTOMÓVEL NO REINO UNIDO E EM 
PORTUGAL – A política industrial no Reino Unido e em Portugal, como na maior parte dos 
países da União Europeia, tem por objectivo a atracção de investimento directo estrangeiro 
(IDE), a criação de emprego e a difusão de 'efeitos de demonstração' das estratégias de 
desenvolvimento  das  novas  unidades  produtivas  ('greenfield')  nas  unidades  já  existentes 
('brownfield'). Estas orientações da política industrial são particularmente visíveis no sector 
automóvel. 
Neste artigo, procuramos comparar a política industrial orientada para a indústria automóvel 
em Portugal e no Reino Unido. Analisam-se dois investimentos do tipo 'greenfield' (Nissan 
na região do Northeast de Inglaterra e Ford/VW na Península de Setúbal, em Portugal) e 
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três investimentos de tipo 'brownfield' (Ford Halewood e GM Ellesmere Port na região do 
North West de Inglaterra e Renault igualmente na Península de Setúbal). 
Iniciamos este artigo com uma discussão da política industrial no sector automóvel, focando 
o papel das estratégias de desenvolvimento de tipo 'greenfield' e o 'efeito de demonstração' 
nas  unidades  existentes.  Em  seguida,  mencionamos  alguns  limites do IDE no sector na 
indústria  automóvel.  Finalmente,  apontamos  as  barreiras  estruturais  ao  'efeito  de  de-
monstração' nas unidades produtivas de tipo 'brownfield', fornecendo igualmente algumas 
alternativas para a estratégia de desenvolvimento destas unidades produtivas. 
 
Palavras-chave: política industrial, indústria automóvel, 'Greenfield', 'Brownfield', Reino 
Unido, Portugal 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The industrial policy in the UK and in Portugal, as in most EU countries, seeks 
to attract new inward investment capacity and jobs, and to promote the impact of 
the so-called 'demonstration effect' of 'greenfield' development strategies pursued 
in the new plants of inward investors on existing or 'brownfield' plants (OLIVER 
and WILKINSON, 1990). This policy has been especially evident in the automobile 
industry in the UK since it has been regarded by Conservative Governments as 
representative  of  the  'British  disease',  characterised  by  low  productivity,  poor 
quality, shop floor militancy as well as weak management and inadequate control 
of labour costs (MARSDEN, MORRIS, WILLMAN and WOOD, 1985). 
In  Portugal  the  automobile  productive  system  has  been  considered  by  the 
Government as a master piece for national economic efficiency and for regional 
development. However, the national strategy is not limited to the attraction of new 
investments,  it  also  focuses  on  high  technology  initiatives  and  pays  particular 
attention to the integration of the automobile plants at the local and regional levels. 
The situation in Portugal is rather different from the UK reality, not least due to 
the longer history of production in the UK, although the automobile industry can 
be characterised by the specialisation on assembly lines, taking advantage of low 
wages, and an infant components industry. 
Much research has examined the levels and nature of inward investment and the 
characteristics of the automobile 'transplants' in the UK (DICKEN, 1992; JONES and 
NORTH,  1991).  These  works  generated  debates  concerning  industrial  strategy, 
investment  levels,  job  creation,  new  labour  processes  and  working  practices, 
reconfigured  labour-management  relations,  new  supplier  linkages  and  levels  of 
local  component  sourcing.  Indeed,  the  'Japanisation'  debate  received  much 
attention in the 1980s (see, for example, OLIVER and WILKINSON, 1990; WOOD, 
1992). However, relatively less research has examined the longer term impacts of 
the UK industrial policy in the automobile industry. 
Research  in  the  automobile  sector  in  Portugal  is  insufficient,  however  the 
recent growth perspectives of the sector have generated research analysis in the 
field of economy, sociology and geography (GUERRA, 1990; MONIZ, 1993; LIMA 
et  al,  1995; FERRÃO and VALE, 1995; GAMA, 1995; GARRINHAS, 1996). The 
focus of these analyses is oriented toward foreign investment and its connections 
with regional productive linkages. The recent Ford/VW investment, one of the 
largest and most high profile in recent years in the automobile industry on the 
European scale, has stimulated the debate on the role of direct foreign investment 
as a means to support economic growth and to improve the competitive level of 
national components industry. This sector is considered a major growth prospect in  
the future and in consequence has been highly emphasised by the industrial policy 
in Portugal. The Ford/VW project is a central element to obtain a qualitative change in 
the sector, seeking to promote intra-sectoral specialisation in deep contrast with the 
inter-sector specialisation promoted by national authorities in the past (FERRÃO and 
VALE, 1995). 
This  paper  redresses  the  shortfall  in  the  nature  and  level  of  automotive 
industrial  research  in  the  UK  and  Portugal.  Several  key  issues  are  addressed, 
comprising  the  industrial  logic  of  allowing  new  entrants  into  the  EU  market, 
regional  shifts  in  automobile  industry  employment,  the maturing of 'greenfield' 
development  strategies,  the  limits  of  the  'demonstration  effect'  in  'brownfield' 
plants and alternatives 'brownfield' development strategies. 
The  research  from  which  the  evidence  is  drawn  examined  in  the  UK  one 
'greenfield' plant, Nissan Sunderland in the North East region, and two 'brownfield' 
plants, Ford Halewood and GM Vauxhall Ellesmere Port in the North West region 
(PIKE, 1994). Nissan's 'transplant' was established in 1986 as the firm's bridgehead 
in the Single European Market
4. Halewood and Ellesmere Port were established in 
the early 1960s to expand model ranges and supplement vehicle assembly and 
component  building  capacity.  In  Portugal,  the  work  focused  on  the  Ford/VW 
'greenfield' plant at Palmela
5 and, one 'brownfield' plant, Renault Portuguesa at Se-
túbal, both of which are in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region. Ford/VW started 
the production of a multi-purpose vehicle in 1995 for the European market. Re-
nault's plant was established in 1980 to produce passenger cars and light commer-
cial  vehicles  for  the  national  market  and  to  other  countries  in  Europe  and,  at 
present, can be considered a singular case in the European automobile panorama
6. 
The paper is divided into five sections. First, industrial policy in the automobile 
industry, 'greenfield' development strategies and the 'demonstration effect' are out-
lined.  Second,  the  limits  of  'greenfield'  strategies  are  discussed.  Third,  the 
structural  barriers  to  the  'demonstration  effect'  within  'brownfield'  plants  are 
detailed.  Fourth,  the  possibilities  for  alternative  'brownfield'  development 
strategies  are  briefly  presented.  Finally,  some  conclusions  about  the  industrial 
policy towards the automotive sector in the UK and Portugal are drawn. 
 
1  –  INDUSTRIAL  POLICY  IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN THE UK AND 
PORTUGAL 
1.1 – UK: 'greenfield' development strategies and the 'demonstration effect' 
UK  industrial  policy  in  the  1980s  and  early  1990s  aimed  to  attract  inward 
investment to the UK from Far Eastern (particularly Japanese) sources, especially 
in the strategic and technologically intensive automotive and electronics sectors. 
The benefits were seen as investment in industrial capacity, jobs and that «inward 
                                                       
  
4 Nissan's investment has recently topped the £1bn level and much of the recent investment has been 
to shield the European operations from the strength of the Yen. For example, the recent £26m axle 
plant was established to replace the increasingly costly imports from Nissan Motor in Japan. 
  
5 According to Ford/VW, the AutoEuropa project is one of the largest investments in the automobile 
industry in recent years, representing an overall investment of ECU 2,550 million. 
  
6 After a long period of divergence between Renault and the Portuguese state, it was agreed that 
Renault plant at Setúbal would be sold to the Portuguese government on the condition that Re-
nault would keep in production their other automobile components plants in Portugal. Renault was 
also committed to buying the Palmela plant's output of Renault Clios until the end of the vehicles 
life cycle.  
investment  brings  world  class  production  techniques,  technical  innovation  and 
managerial  skills,  which  can  be  transferred  to  local  companies»  (HM 
GOVERNMENT,  1994,  p.  94).  In  particular,  the  automotive  sector  was 
highlighted as an industry whose international competitiveness had been 'revived' 
by such investment. Indeed, in addition to the direct effects:  
 
«the indirect benefits have also been profound. The arrival of world-
-class  Japanese  manufacturers,  with  associated  component  suppliers,  in 
three areas of England (the North East, Derbyshire, the M4 corridor) and 
North  Wales  has  spurred  established  producers  to  greater  efforts. 
Continuous improvement has resulted in higher productivity, improved quality 
and increased reliability of parts» (HM GOVERNMENT, 1994, p. 94).  
 
The general aim of the industrial policy has been twofold. First, to 'win' mobile 
investment  and  create  industrial  capacity  (with  export  potential)  and  jobs  in 
'greenfield' plants in the UK. Second, to provide a 'demonstration effect' to the 
existing  producers  in  'brownfield'  plants  and  encourage  them  to  upgrade  their 
competitiveness.  First,  the  attraction  of  inward  investment  mainly  focused  on 
bringing  in  major  'flagship'  projects  to  'greenfield'  sites.  The  industrial  policy 
belied  also  the  Government's  regulatory  strategy  for  the  UK  economy.  Key 
attractions promoted to inward investors included the low corporate and personal 
taxation rates, favourable exchange rate (especially for exports), low labour and 
social  costs,  de-regulated  labour  utilisation  context,  and  the  'opt-out'  from  the 
Social Chapter of Maastricht but, crucially, the retained position within the Single 
European Market. Other elements emphasised included the «high labour quality 
and flexibility», «deregulated business environment» and «the warmth of welcome 
and  attitude  of  Government  and  investment  promotion  agencies»  (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 1994, p. 94). A favourable grant regime was also integral to the 
policy.  In  addition  to  the  Structural  Funds  support,  the  discretionary  Regional 
Selective  Assistance  (RSA)  was  increasingly  linked  to  the  character  of  such 
investment. The emphasis on new entrants in 'greenfield' plants was central to the 
message of 'renewal' and 'renaissance' to change the character of the manufacturing 
base in the UK. The transplants also enjoyed substantial political support, with the 
Government 'fighting their corner' in EU debates concerning output levels, local 
content and the free circulation of vehicles within the Single Market (SADLER, 
1993). In its own terms, the Government can claim some success for the first part 
of  its  industrial  policy.  In  the  automotive  industry,  over  half  (57%)  of  the 
investment in Japanese vehicle assembly capacity and over one third of the jobs 
within the EU are in the UK (Table I). 
The  second  'demonstration  effect'  strand  of  the  policy  linked  explicitly  to 
spreading  the  benefits  achieved  by  new  inward  investors  pursuing  'greenfield' 
development  strategies  in  new  'greenfield'  sites  to  other  existing  producers 
operating in 'brownfield' sites. These benefits comprise the ability to start afresh 
and implement 'state of the art' approaches in several key areas: physical site and 
services,  plant  equipment  and  layout,  recruitment  and  labour-management 
relations, and supplier linkages. Site and services benefits included choosing an 
appropriate site, planning the situation of the plant and assembling the site and 
services to specification (often paid for at least in part by the local authorities)
7 as 
well as building the plant to order. 
                                                       
  
7 Some controversy has arisen in relation to land deals put together to attract inward investors. For 
example, the European Commission made Toyota pay an extra £4.2m for the 580 acre site it  
For plant equipment and layout, 'greenfield' plants can invest in 'state of the art' 
production technologies, introduce 'lean' production techniques, lay out the plant 
for  maximum  flow  and  efficiency  as  well  as  integration  with  suppliers.  For 
recruitment  and  labour-management  relations,  benefits  included  selective 
recruitment  and  establishing  relations  and  modes  of  engagement  with  new 
employees  and  trades  unions  afresh  (if  at  all)
8.  'Greenfield'  plants  employing 
markedly different forms of 'Human      
Table I – Japanese Vehicle Assembly Transplants: Projected Capacity 
and Employment in Western Europe, 1994 
Quadro 1 – Transplantes Japoneses na Montagem de Veículos: Estimativas de Capacidade 
e de Emprego na Europa Ocidental, 1994 
 
Company  Location  Estimated 
Capacity 
Capacity 
(%) 
Estimated 
Employment 
Employment 
(%) 
Honda  Swindon  200,000  11.1  1,300  5.3 
IBC1  Luton  100,000  5.6  1,800  7.3 
Mazda2  Dagenham  25,000  1.4  -  - 
Nissan  Washington  400,000  22.3  4,076  16.6 
Toyota  Burnaston  300,000  16.7  2,000  8.1 
UK Sub-Total    1,025,000  57.0  9,176  37.3 
Nissan  Barcelona  200,000  11.1  6,7503  27.5 
Suzuki4  Linares  150,000  8.3  2,8005  11.4 
Spain Sub-Total    350,000  19.5  9,550  38.8 
Daihatsu  Italy  60,000  3.3  400  1.6 
Mitsubishi-Volvo6  Ghent, 
Netherlands 
200,000  11.1  1,800  7.3 
Suzuki  Esztergom, 
Hungary 
50,000  2.8  1,300  5.3 
Toyota7  Hannover,  Ger-
many 
100,000  5.6  -  - 
Toyota/Salvador 
Caetano 
Lisbon, Portugal8  12,000  0.7  2,3609  9.6 
Other Sub-Total    422,000  23.5  5,860  23.8 
Total    1,797,000  100.0  24,586  100.0 
 
Notes: 
1  IBC (Isuzu Bedford Company) is a GM (60%)/Isuzu (40%) joint venture; 
2  Mazda agreed with Ford to produce 30,000 vehicles at Dagenham; 
3  Includes related component suppliers; 
4  Suzuki Linares' future is in doubt following Suzuki's losses in Japan and the negotiations for a rescue 
package, meeting permitted state aid regulations, between the Spanish national and regional governments 
and the European Commission; 
5  1991 figure; 
6  Volvo  Car  BV,  formerly  70%  owned  by  the  Dutch  Government,  established  a  joint  venture  with 
Mitsubishi  to  produce  the  'NedCar',  following  the  sale  of  a  33.3%  stake  from  the  Dutch  state  to 
Mitsubishi, and a 3.3% stake sale to Volvo, to create a joint venture based on equal equity holdings; 
7  Joint production with VW; 
8  We exclude production agreements between Japanese and Portuguese automotive enterprises (namely 
Mazda) and we are not taking in account the recent investment of Mitsubishi in Portugal; 
9  Includes related component suppliers. 
                                                                                                                                       
acquired for its Burnaston assembly plant after it suspected Derbyshire County Council of selling 
the site at an artificially low price of £18.3m, which constituted illegal state aid (see PIKE, 1994). 
  
8 Honda's Swindon plant is non-union and no recognition agreement has been signed. Nissan and 
Toyota have single union deals with the AEEU and IBC is a multi-union plant.  
Sources: IMF, 1995; PIKE, 1994; RUIGROK et al, 1991. 
 
Resource Management' strategies have also helped both to create and profit from 
the 'new realism' in industrial relations in the UK (BEARDWELL, 1992). Supplier 
relations  benefit  from  establishing  linkages  with  suppliers  afresh,  often  nearby 
assemblers to enable JIT logistics, a site and factory layout capable of rapid JIT 
turnaround,  standardised  supplier  selection  and  accreditation  procedures.  New 
assemblers also have strong bargaining positions vis a vis suppliers due to their 
long term supply contracts and significant component spend. Indirect 'knock-on' 
effects of 'greenfield' plants include joint training and standard setting, links with 
universities  and  involvement  in  organisations  representative of local employers 
(COOPERS & LYBRAND DELOITTE, 1991)
9. For UK industrial policy, the benefits 
of 'greenfield' development strategies have been portrayed as the solution to the 
'British Disease' allegedly evident in the 'brownfield' plants of existing automotive 
producers. 
Much has been claimed for the impact of the 'demonstration effect'. Advocates 
have accentuated the «infectious example» set by the introduction of «...new skills 
and new methods to regional economies» and celebrated the success of attracting 
inward  investment  in  an  increasingly  competitive  global  market  place  (Peter 
Lilley, former Trade and Industry Secretary, quoted in TOMANEY, 1991, p. 10). 
Earlier  in  the  1980s,  Norman  Tebbit,  then  Trade  and  Industry  Secretary,  also 
emphasised the 'demonstration effect': «Nissan has high productivity. It has good 
labour/management relations. Everything is an object of envy for us. We want 
them to set up in Britain to demonstrate to our auto makers... these aspects of 
Japanese industrial management» (quoted in CAITS, 1991, p. 1).  
The positive impact on the performance and competitiveness of UK suppliers, 
particularly  for  product  development,  quality  assurance,  plant  and  machinery, 
delivery  times  and  cost  control  has  also  been  emphasised  (PA  CAMBRIDGE 
ECONOMIC CONSULTANCY, 1995). WOMACK et al. (1990) underline the ability and 
superior  performance  of  transplants  in  employing  'lean'  production  techniques. 
SADLER (1993, p. 8) notes that «The UK government's favourable attitude to Japa-
nese  assemblers  rested  upon  their  potential  transformatory  impact  upon  labour 
relations, automotive component manufacturers and other assemblers». POLLERT 
(1992,  p.  xxiii)  stresses  that  «greenfield  sites...  arguably  provide  the  best 
opportunities for the most strategic implementation of new functional flexibility in 
'Japanisation' policies». The national representative organisation SMMT (Society 
of Motor Manufacturers and Traders) even claimed that the adoption of Japanese 
techniques  had  transformed  the  automobile  industry  in  the  UK  «into  the  most 
exciting  and  influential  of  the  'sunrise'  industries»,  such  that  «at  the  centre  of 
Britain's  industrial  renaissance  is  the  motor  industry»  (SMMT,  1989,  p.  1).  A 
substantial degree of optimism has accompanied the apparent success of the UK 
industrial policy in the automobile industry. However, the optimism appears rather 
misplaced  when  the  more  enduring  questions  of  industrial  logic,  absolute  and 
relative  regional  employment  change  and  the  ephemeral  nature  of  'greenfield' 
development strategies are considered. 
 
                                                       
  
9 Ian Gibson, ex-Ford Manager in the 1970s and now Chairman of Nissan Sunderland, has also 
been appointed to the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) executive. The first 
time a Japanese company has gained representation within the main national lobbying organisation 
for the UK motor industry.  
1.2  –  Portugal:  'greenfield'  development  strategies  and  competitive 
improvement 
The small size of the Portuguese market has been the main constraint to the 
establishment of a competitive automotive industry. FERRÃO and VALE (1995) ar-
gue that this constraint was reinforced by the failure to create a nationally-owned 
motorcar industry due to the Portuguese Government's non-interventionist policy 
stance in the Estado Novo period (New State). Industrial activity was not seen as a 
priority at that time. However, the economic shifts in Portugal and the need to be 
part of EFTA produced the necessary conditions for a change in the nature of 
development  policies.  Since  the  1960's  some  efforts  were  made  in  order  to 
establish  an  import-substitution  model  of  economic  growth.  In  the  automobile 
sector severe restrictions upon the import of CBU (Completely Built-Up) vehicles 
were put in place and, at the same time, the Government decreed that vehicles 
were to be assembled in Portugal on the basis of at least 15 per cent Portuguese 
share of value-added (MIE, 1991). 
These policy limitations in the automotive industry led to severe difficulties for 
several car manufacturers and, by the end of 1970's, another legal framework was 
developed. In 1979 the automobile sector came under a jurisdiction – Motorcar-In-
dustry Act no. 351/79 – which intended to reconvert the assembly lines and to pro-
mote the components industry. In fact, if the industrial policy towards the automo-
bile industry had not changed the closure of the assembly lines and subsidiary 
industries would have been inevitable (GUERRA, 1993). The new legal framework 
allowed  the  restructuring  of  the  automobile  industry  by  focusing  on  both  the 
vehicle assembly lines and the components industries. 
The most significant result of this policy is observable in the Renault Project. 
This firm was selected in the international bidding process and it demanded as a 
necessary condition the need for a temporary market protection which became a 
reality  with  the  support  of  European  authorities  and  EFTA.  GUERRA  (1993) 
concludes  that,  in  this  sense,  the  Renault  Project  was  instrumental  to  the 
consolidation of the export promotion policy. 
Portuguese industrial policy since the second half of the 1980's has focused on 
the  attraction  of  further  foreign  direct  investments.  The  new  objectives  of  the 
industrial policy were a consequence of the integration of Portugal into the EU and, at 
the same time, the change of Government to the Centre-Right Social Democratic Party 
(PSD). 
As in the UK, the industrial policy in the automobile sector is twofold. First, to 
attract inward investment, both in car assembly and in component manufacture. 
Second,  to  create  and  to  reinforce  the  national  components  industry.  The  first 
policy  goal  focused  on  the  attraction  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI), 
particularly from the other EU countries and also from Brazil and the Far East 
(although  the  FDI  from  non-EU  countries  is  relatively  low  in  the  automobile 
sector). The investments in the automotive industry were seen by the Government 
as: 
«...those fields of activity are chosen where it will be presumably diffi-
cult for the Portuguese investors to participate alone, due to the existing 
barriers, such as technology, scale and financial capacity problems. The 
automobile components business is the best example of field where the re-
quired progress and updating is practically only possible through foreign 
investment. This is evidenced by Renault project around which a whole 
group of national companies flourished» (MIE, 1991, p. 8-9). 
  
The  relevance  of  the  automobile  sector  in  Portugal  is  evident  and  recently 
PORTER
10 stressed the possibilities for a cluster creation. As in the UK case the in-
dustrial policy ought to work horizontally, to integrate deeply this filière, and to 
link  with  other  related  sectors  (textile,  electronics,  rubber  and  plastic,  metal 
products) (GARRINHAS, 1996). 
Through this industrial policy, the automotive sector was expected to create in-
dustrial capacity and jobs. In employment terms, the Government is paying parti-
cular attention to training, as a consequence of the traditional low skills level of 
Portuguese workers. The 'greenfield' investments are meant to achieve and diffuse 
new labour practices and to sustain the 'enterprise culture'. As in the UK, the tradi-
tional trade union organisations play a more limited role than in the past and in the 
new projects their strength is relatively low. 
The sector is also expected to increase the level of exports, although the weak-
ness of the national productive fabric in the components industry has generated a 
growth  in  imports.  To  rectify  this  situation, not only the quantity but also the 
quality of the products is stressed, where the 'greenfield' investments are again the 
easiest way to achieve this goal. The attraction of 'greenfield' investments is based 
in the progressive quality of the business environment of some Portuguese regions 
(mainly the North and the Lisbon and Tagus Valley regions). This is the case 
whether it concerns infrastructures (high improvements on accessibility) or better 
supply  of  business-related  services.  These  benefits  comprise  physical  site  and 
services,  plant  equipment  and  layout,  recruitment  and  labour-management 
relations and supplier linkages. 
The  second  objective  of  the  Portuguese  industrial  policy  is  related  to  the 
strength of the automobile components industry. The Government argued that the 
easiest way to achieve this policy goal was to base it on the attraction of inward 
investment. The promotion of 'greenfield' investments in the vehicles assembly 
sector was thought to provide the supply linkages with the highest possible level of 
components made in Portugal. As the quality and the technological level of the 
required components are crucial to the car makers, the Portuguese components 
industry would then be stimulated by this challenge and would have to improve 
their  competitive  level  in  terms  of  output  capacity,  technology,  quality,  labour 
skills and work organisation. 
In order to improve competitiveness of the national components suppliers, a 
quality and stable market has in effect been created in Portugal, at least for a 
reasonable  period  which  has  been  supplemented  by  inward  investment.  The 
Renault  project  was  an  important  instrument  to  consolidate  and  to  expand  the 
national components industry. It is expected that the Ford/VW project would have 
a similar or even more prolific effect due to the high quality of the product and the 
amount of investment involved in the formation of this joint-venture
11. 
The demonstration effect occurring in the UK is more oriented towards the 
components industry in Portugal rather than the vehicle assembly lines. With this 
stimulus,  the  Government  expect  the  sector  to  become  more  competitive 
internationally, particularly in the EU, to export higher quality products and gain a 
                                                       
10  MONITOR COMPANY (1994) – Construir as Vantagens Competitivas de Portugal. Monitor 
Company, Lisboa. 
11  The  overall  investment  reaches  ECU  2,550  million  and  the  incentives  and  tax  exemptions 
represent ECU 750 million. Ford/VW plant produces a people carrier, and the maximum output 
capacity  is  180,00  vehicles/year.  Around  99%  of  production  is  for  the  European market. The 
figures for the employment were initially forecasted in 5,000 direct jobs, but in fact a little more 
than direct 3,000 jobs were created.  
more important place in the automobile supplier networks across Europe. In fact, 
since Ford/VW started production in 1995, the turnover of automobile components 
industry in Portugal rose by 9%, and the domestic market rose be nearly 15%. 
However, in 1995, the exports represented 79% of the turnover in this industry
12. 
State financial assistance has played a significant role in the Portuguese indus-
trial policy. To achieve their goals the Government provided considerable support 
for both Renault and Ford/VW. Although the cost/productivity ratio of manpower 
is above the EU average (MIE, 1991), the peripheral position of Portugal has to be 
compensated  by  financial  support.  Tax  exemptions,  grants,  the  low  cost  of 
industrial  sites  and  state  aids  for  job-training  are  the  direct  forms  of  financial 
support  used  until  now  by  the  national  authorities.  These  have  a  national 
component as well as a European one, through the structural funds (ERDF and 
ESF). The PEDIP (Specific Programme for Portuguese Industry Development) and 
SIBR  (Regional  Incentives  System)  are  the  specific  national  programmes  that 
support both national and international enterprises. 
 
2 – PROBLEMS AND LIMITS TO 'GREENFIELD' DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
In terms of industrial logic, the arrival of the Japanese transplants has added to 
substantial  overcapacity  within  the  European  automobile  industry.  Recent 
estimates calculate a level of 1-1.2m vehicles (DICKEN, 1992), roughly equivalent 
to  the  transplant  capacity  established  in  the  UK.  In  Europe,  this  overcapacity 
equals the total output of one of the 'Big 6' automobile groups (VW, GM, PSA, 
FIAT, Ford and Renault). Overcapacity has led to intensified competition and the 
rationalisation of capacity, primarily amongst the 'brownfield' plants of existing 
producers which have further to travel to become competitive or to close down and 
establish 'greenfield' plants elsewhere. Further, the transplant capacity has been 
supported, depending on its locational eligibility, by a whole array of national and 
European grant measures, which have only been captured by existing producers 
when they have been investing rather than going through the current retrenchment. 
 
2.1 – The UK restructuring process 
Several questions arise from the entry of Japanese capacity into the UK. First, 
the addition of the transplants may still be insufficient to offset, and may even 
aggravate,  the  balance  of  payments  pressures  present  within  the  sector. 
Historically, due to the large size of the UK car market (often 2nd or 3rd largest in 
the EU), weak export performance and the high propensity for import penetration, 
both from foreign and UK-based producers (so-called 'tied' imports) of vehicles 
and components, has meant the sector runs a trade deficit. The transplants have re-
inforced such problems due to the narrow range of products produced within the 
UK (e.g. only Nissan Sunderland produces two different models). This strategy 
requires vehicle imports to complete the model range and the import of high value-
-added components (especially transmissions, engine blocks and other precision 
forgings)
13.  Moreover,  the  explicit  commitment  by  the  transplants  to  export  a 
                                                       
12  This  information  is  based  on  a  recent  report  of  the  Portuguese  Automobile  Manufacturers 
Association (AFIA), diffused by the media, namely Diário de Notícias, 7/10/96. 
13  A large majority of capital equipment in the transplants is also imported, often from 
Japan (PIKE, 1994).  
proportion of their output is made on the back of expanding levels of production, 
leaving more units to be sold in the domestic UK market. Second, ownership is 
central and evidence suggests Japanese capital maintains substantial component 
and  vehicle  production  in  Japan,  supported  by  centralised  corporate  R&D 
laboratories,  and  affiliated  suppliers  have  been  encouraged  to  internationalise 
(often  since  they  have  cross-shareholdings),  and  profit  repatriation  is  to  be 
expected  once  transplant  investments  have  been  amortised  (WILLIAMS  et  al., 
1992). In combination, these issues suggest that the industrial logic of allowing the 
entry of Japanese transplant capacity is not as clear as the UK industrial policy 
assumes. 
In terms of job creation the picture is more accurately described as net job dis-
placement. Approximately 9,000 jobs in total have been created directly in the UK 
plants of Honda, Isuzu, Nissan and Toyota. Indirect employment in suppliers to the 
four  plants  has  been  estimated  at  6,000  jobs  (ECONOMISTS  ADVISORY 
GROUP/IWG, 1994; PIKE, 1994). Total direct and indirect employment is approxi-
mately 14,576. While substantial, this jobs total fails even to compensate for the 
28,000 losses within Ford and GM Vauxhall alone in the UK between 1960 and 
1992 (PIKE, 1994). In addition, total employment in the motor vehicles and compo-
nents sector fell from close to 500,000 to nearly 200,000 between 1974 and 1992 
(Employment  Gazette,  Various  Issues).  As  Ford  note  in  their  criticism  of  UK 
industrial policy, the picture is one of substantial net job loss: 
 
 
«...in  real  terms,  for  every  one  Japanese  company  job  that  is 
generated, helped by government support, there must be two or three 
that are lost elsewhere in the industry. So if you net it out it is going to 
look like not a good decision to make» (Ford Motor Company Mana-
ger, cited in PIKE, 1994, p. 398). 
 
While all of the employment losses can clearly not be linked directly to the 
arrival  of  Honda,  Isuzu,  Nissan  and  Toyota,  the  impending  European  market 
liberalization  and  the  rapid  gains  in  market  share  of  the  Japanese  producers 
elsewhere  in  Europe  appear  to  have  promoted  job  rationalization  amongst  the 
existing automobile producers in the UK. While the threat of Japanese competition 
has been used by existing manufacturers for many years, the situation appears not 
to be one of 'crying wolf' any longer. Indeed, Ford have used their criticism of the 
transplants to justify their own actions: 
«With the growing presence of Japanese transplant facilities in Britain 
operating with the advantages of a greenfield site and extremely low levels 
of engineering and manufacturing integration, it should not be surprising 
that an established company such as Ford must shed labour to ensure its 
future  competitiveness  and  prosperity»  (Ian  McAllister,  Ford  UK 
Chairman quoted in FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 1992). 
 
The map of automobile production jobs within the UK has also been redrawn. 
'Greenfield'  regions,  those  lacking  a  pronounced  history  of  automobile 
manufacture, have seen relative growth (Table II). In total, employment in the UK 
automobile  industry  declined  by  over  34%  between  1981  and  1991,  a  loss  of 
120,500 jobs. Over the same period, however, only the Northern region, (including 
Nissan  and  its  suppliers)  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Yorkshire  and  Humberside 
exhibited  modest  growth  from  low  base  figures,  increasing  the  number  of  
automobile jobs from 7,100 to 8,100 and 12,300 to 13,100 respectively. The East 
Midlands (including Toyota and its suppliers) also exhibited a markedly lesser 
decline than other regions. Elsewhere in the UK employment in the sector declined 
substantially. Scotland, Wales, London and the South East all lost over 40% of 
their automobile-related employment, some 60,800 jobs and the North West and 
West Midlands both declined by over 30%, losing over 58,000 jobs. In total, the 
sector declined from over 1.6% of total UK employment to just over 1% between 
1981  and  1991.  Significantly,  in  England  the  South  East,  West  Midlands  and 
North  West  regions  experienced  the  sharpest  declines  in  shares  of  total 
employment,  approaching  half  in  each  region.  Elsewhere,  only  Yorkshire  and 
Humberside and the Northern region registered growth. These increases came from 
a low base and failed to compensate for declines elsewhere. In addition, not only 
are  the  new  jobs  in  the  automobile  sector  geographically  removed  from  those 
labour  markets  where  they  have  been  lost  –  implying  at  least  some  degree  of 
labour  mobility  –  but  the  new  jobs  are  often in 'greenfield' plants which have 
exercised their ability to pursue rather different recruitment practices than those 
historically  characteristic  of  the  industry.  The  old  skills  and  attitudes  of 
unemployed car workers are unlikely to find employment in such plants
14. 
 
Table II – Change and Share in Motor Vehicles and Parts Sector Employment in the UK, by Region, 
1981-91 
Quadro II – Variação e Distribuição do Emprego na Indústria Automóvel no Reino Unido, por Re-
giões, 1981-91 
Standard Region  Year  Year  Change (%)  Share of Total Employment 
(%) 
  1981  1991  1981-1991  1981  1991 
South East  68,880  40,600  -41.06  1.87  1.03 
East Anglia  5,100  4,400  -13.73  0.75  0.56 
London  33,400  17,300  -48.20  0.94  0.53 
South West  9,400  8,000  -14.89  0.61  0.47 
West Midlands  114,800  74,700  -34.93  5.65  3.67 
East Midlands  10,200   9,700  -4.90  0.70  0.64 
Yorkshire  and 
Humberside 
12,300  13,100  6.50  0.67  0.71 
North West  53,300  34,500  -35.27  2.17  1.46 
Northern  7,100  8,100  14.08  0.63  0.74 
Wales  19,400  10,500  -45.88  2.07  1.09 
Scotland  11,300  3,700  -67.26  0.57  0.18 
UK Total  345,100  224,600  -34.92  1.62  1.04 
Source: NOMIS, 1991. 
 
 
The limits of 'greenfield' development strategies have been evident also in the 
transplants since their arrival. Many of the 'first mover' advantages of establishing 
on  'greenfield'  sites  and  pursuing  'greenfield'  development  strategies  are  often 
                                                       
14  Jim Thomas, MSF National Automotive Officer, noted of the new employment opportunities that: 
"I was having a debate with some of our guys in Fords at Halewood and the same would go for 
Ellesmere Port, I guess. They say 'look, tell the company if we don't get this we are all going to go 
to Toyota.' I said that Toyota won't have you. You guys are car makers, you have got bad habits. 
They don't see your experience as an opportunity, they see it as a disadvantage" (Author's Inter-
view, 1992)  
diluted, if not lost altogether, with the passage of time. What WILLIAMS et al. 
(1994,  p.  233)  term  the  «long  descent  into  ordinariness».  The  point  is  that 
'greenfield' plants age and mature and perhaps lose many of the benefits of being a 
'greenfield'  plant  over  time.  The  UK  industrial  policy  emphasis  on  'greenfield' 
development  strategies  and  their  'demonstration  effect'  therefore  looks 
questionable. Indeed, Halewood and Ellesmere Port were once 'greenfield' plants 
in the early 1960s and enjoyed many of the same benefits as the transplants did on 
their arrival. Both plants had the advantages of «...picking the cream of the labour 
market»  and  «green  labour»  not  used  to  the  rigours  of  assembly  line 
manufacturing, due to the decline of traditional port-related industries and high 
unemployment in Merseyside (BEYNON, 1984, p. 101). However, it appears that, 
while the intentions were good, the practice turned out somewhat different with 
the passage of time: 
«We went there with the idea of having a good plant; one with 
good labour relations. We wanted to get a trouble free plant, to get 
away from Dagenham and Dagenham ways. It didn't turn out like that 
though» (Halewood Personnel Director, quoted in BEYNON, 1984, p. 76). 
 
Similarly, Nissan has enjoyed the 'honeymoon period' of initial plant set up and 
expansion. However, production had to be cut back following the downturn in the 
European automobile market in the early 1990s and Nissan have had to adjust to 
the  more  normal  cyclical  market  demand  within  Europe.  This  resulted  in  the 
cancellation of the nightshift and 350 voluntary redundancies from a workforce of 
close to 4,500 (7.7%). Falling output also reduced demand for inputs amongst their 
local supplier complex, many of which arrived in the North East solely to support 
Nissan's transplant. These supplier satellites often found they were of insufficient 
size to break into the supply chains of existing producers to secure longer term 
supply contracts
15. Nissan have also had to persist with continuous improvement 
programs, the latest of which is 'NX '96', as part of attempting to reach a moving 
target for performance. Other Japanese investments within Europe appear also to 
have reached the relative limits of expansion in the European market and a degree 
of  rationalisation  is  evident,  for  example  at  Suzuki  Linares  and  Nissan  Motor 
Iberica  in  Spain  (DONE,  1995).  This  evidence  presents  a  cautionary  argument 
against  the  UK  Government's  industry  policy  emphasis  on  the  seemingly 
ephemeral benefits of 'greenfield' development strategies and their example
16. 
2.2 – Portugal: peripheral growth in the EU 
The automobile sector in the EU is facing a restructuring process due to the 
creation of the Single Market and the Japanese threat (FERRÃO and VALE, 1995). 
The Iberian Peninsula, especially Spain, became more specialised in automotive 
production. In Portugal, the processes of change are also evident, and they are 
closely linked to broader restructuring within Europe. The car makers in Europe 
have reorganised themselves on a trans-European basis and some of peripheral re-
gions in the South and increasingly Central and Eastern Europe are integrated into 
this new map of automobile production. 
                                                       
15  Given this shock to the local cluster of suppliers, some firms have managed to diversify their 
customer base. TRW Valves, for example, now supply Ford, Saab and VW in addition to Nissan. 
16  IRS (1993) even suggest that labour law reforms and the recession have had more influence on 
working methods in the UK than the example of companies like Nissan.  
The Japanese investments in Portugal are not very significant, however in terms 
of  regional  impact  they  are  quite  important  (see  for  instance  Mitsubishi, 
Toyota/Salvador Caetano and Yazaki Saltano). 
The regional breakdown of employment shows clearly a concentration on the 
coastal area, mainly in the Oporto and Lisbon metropolitan areas. In fact, in 1993 
the Oporto region (Aveiro, Braga and Oporto districts) had more than half of the 
automobile sector employment in Portugal (52%) and the Lisbon region (Lisbon 
and Setúbal districts) accounted for more than about 30% (not taking in account 
the employment of Ford/VW and Ford suppliers located in the industrial park at 
Palmela). Leiria and Viseu in the Centre region can be highlighted, the former 
because  of  the  components  industry  and  the  latter  related  to  the  low  volume 
assembly line of Citroën. A regional shift in the automotive industry was also 
evident  in  Portugal  even  before  its  reinforcement  by  the  Lisbon  metropolitan 
region in deep association with the Ford/VW plant and nearby suppliers. 
 
Table III – Share of Motor Vehicles and Parts Sector Employment in Portugal, by District, 1993 
Quadro III – Distribuição do Emprego na Indústria Automóvel em Portugal, por Distrito, 1993 
 
District  Employment 
% 
Aveiro  25.2 
Beja  0.1 
Braga  10.4 
Bragança  0.1 
Castelo Branco  0.2 
Coimbra  1.3 
Évora  3.0 
Faro  0.2 
Guarda  0.3 
Leiria  3.4 
Lisboa  16.2 
Portalegre  0.0 
Porto  16.5 
Santarém  6.4 
Setúbal  12.8 
V. Castelo  0.1 
V. Real  0.1 
Viseu  3.9 
Total  17,240 
 
Note: The figures presented in the table do not comprehend the employment 
generated by recent inward investments in the sector, both Ford/VW 
assembly plant and automobile components firms. 
Source: MESS, 1994. 
 
The location of the recent inward investments has stressed the importance of 
the  Lisbon  Metropolitan  Area.  In  particular,  this  was  due  to  the  Ford/VW 
investment,  which  generated  more  than 3,000 direct jobs and more than 1,500 
indirect ones (COSTA and VALE, 1996). The very recent inward investments like 
the Ford car air conditioning systems in Setúbal have also to be taken into account. 
A  recent  report  by  AFIA  claimed  that  the  overall  level  of  employment  solely  
within  the  components  sector  stood  at  approximately  23,500  employees, 
representing 150 firms, of which 10 were created in 1995. 
The most important assembly lines are located in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley 
regions, for example Renault, Ford/VW, Opel, Ford and Mitsubishi. Only Citroën 
and some national producers of Japanese commercial vehicles under license are 
located outside this region. The 'greenfield' investments do not tend to avoid tradi-
tional manufacturing regions, especially the Setúbal Peninsula where the industrial 
workers maintain their collective solidarity and the presence of the trade unions 
remains important. This situation is completely different from the UK. Part of the 
difference is explained by the fact that the Lisbon Metropolitan Area has more 
advantages, mainly in terms of infrastructure and job skills. In other words, the ag-
glomeration economies are more evident in this region. 
In spite of the historically high risk of strikes in the region it must be said that 
in order to avoid this constraint, 'greenfield' production plants have recruited fresh 
'green' labour with no previous work experience whatsoever in manufacturing acti-
vities. For instance, Ford/VW recruited young workers; the average age is 26 years 
and 90% are males. The job training has been provided by the company and the 
work  organisation  is  centered  on  teams,  which  are  not  suitable  for  traditional 
industrial workers more used to rigid job descriptions and demarcation. 
The  limits  of  'greenfield'  development  strategies  are  evident.  Although 
production started only in 1995, the Ford/VW plant at Palmela has already had 
some  problems.  The  initially  stated  objectives  regarding  employment  and 
production were not achieved. In fact, the forecast creation of 5,000 jobs generated 
by  the  company  and  a  production  output  of  180,000  vehicles  a  year  were  not 
achieved (the volume was only around 50,000 vehicles in 1995, although only by 
the end of the decade the full production capacity should be reached). The problem 
is  the  overcapacity  in  this  segment  (multi-purpose  vehicles)  in  the  EU.  If  the 
market does not react well to the product of Ford/VW joint-venture (which is not 
the case at the moment), the initial sales forecasts will not be achieved. Despite the 
overcapacity, Ford expects the expansion of the market through the strength of the 
dealer networks of Ford and VW. 
As in the UK, the situation in Portugal concerning the 'greenfield' development 
strategy therefore looks questionable. The risks of failure of these type of projects 
and  the  limits  of  the  'demonstration  effect'  should  not  be  underestimated  by 
national  authorities  and  the  evaluation  of  the project will have to be rigorous. 
Nowadays the arrival of similar products to the market, production overcapacity in 
the  EU,  and  participation  of  national  suppliers  only  in  the  lower  complexity 
components raise many questions about the capability of the project to reinforce 
the competitiveness of the national components industry. 
3 –  DIFFICULTIES  OF  ADJUSTMENT  AND  ALTERNATIVE  STRATEGIES  FOR 
'BROWNFIELD' PLANTS 
3.1. – Limits and structural barriers 
Evidence from Ford Halewood, GM Vauxhall Ellesmere Port and Renault Setú-
bal  reveals  apparent  limits,  and  even  structural  barriers,  to  adjustment  and the 
'demonstration effect' in 'brownfield' plants. First, 'brownfield' plants are marked 
by socially constructed attitudes, conventions and approaches which have been  
accumulated by the workforce, trades unions and management through their shared 
experiences in the plant. 
These attitudes can act to frame and limit the ways in which change is introduc-
ed, negotiated and implemented on the part of both workforce, trades unions and 
management. In particular, a marked reluctance to change due to the perceived 
risks involved has been evident, especially in the context of an unwillingness to 
disturb production continuity to test new ideas. Often traditional 'right to manage' 
strategies based on threats of redundancies and closure have been insufficient due 
to the magnitude of changes required. A more progressive management approach 
has  been  required  to  foster  the  workforce  commitment  and  reward  their 
participation in job (re)design and kaizen activities. 
Second, the pace at which adjustment to respond to the 'demonstration effect' is 
expected to occur is reaching effective limits, particularly given the historically 
and  socially  constructed  inertia  within  'brownfield'  plants.  These  comprise  the 
changing  of  job  specifications  within  teams  faster  than  training  or  workforce 
proficiency can keep pace with and the failure of training to provide the necessary 
workforce skills in the context of labour shedding. Whether, or if, adjustment to 
Japanese  'best  practice'  levels  of  efficiency  can  be  reached  before  ultimate 
rationalisation and closure occurs has consequently been a cause for concern in the 
'brownfield'  plants.  Lastly,  the  particular  norms  and  expectations  of  an  ageing 
workforce  constructed  through  their  particular  employment  histories  have  also 
hindered changes, reinforced by job rationalisation and the lack of recruitment in 
recent years. Substantial levels of retraining have occurred, creating a dilemma for 
management in investing in potential early retirement candidates. Moreover, older 
members  of  the  workforce  are  said  to  be  unwilling  to  undertake  new  tasks  in 
contrast to new recruits which have had no time in which to develop expectations 
relating to their daily working tasks. 
In  addition  to  the  apparent  limits,  certain  structural  barriers  to  the 
'demonstration  effect'  are  evident  mainly  due  to  the  position  of  the  plants  in 
broader  corporate  structures  of  production.  The  capability  to  effect  industrial 
adjustment  is  often  hampered  by  plants  being  locked  into  intra-corporate 
competition for investment. Ford and GM's UK plants are closely integrated into 
pan-European (and even global) product life cycles, component supply networks 
and  production  systems.  While  having  increased  their  relative  autonomy  and 
responsibility in recent years, these plants are often not free, or are unable, to raise 
the investment to reorganise unilaterally. Change depends on their position and 
perceived 'reliability' within the company. The same situation applies to Renault 
Setúbal  where  corporate-wide  restructuring  has  led  to  rationalisation,  posing 
significant problems for the workforce. Initially, redundancy and dramatic changes 
in work organisation were seen as fundamental to restoring the competitiveness of 
the plant. However, even with these changes, Renault Setúbal has had difficulties 
in competing with other 'greenfield' plants. In fact, the opportunities in Central and 
Eastern Europe has led several car makers to restructure their production network 
and the Setúbal plant is no longer seen as an important piece of Renault's European 
strategy.  The  perceived  lack  of  competitiveness  at  the  plant  is  a  result  of  the 
broader adjustment difficulties in 'brownfield' plants due to new 'lean production' 
techniques, the small domestic market in Portugal (before Portugal's accession to 
the EU, Renault had a protected market in Portugal through a quota system), and a 
substantial cut of financial aids by national authorities. 
The Renault administration, workers and Government (which have a capital 
participation in the factory) did not agree on the development strategy of the plant  
in Portugal. However, after a long period of negotiation and threats, Renault and 
the national authorities agreed to maintain the factory under the full responsibility 
of  the  Portuguese  authorities,  until  the end of Clio model's life cycle. In turn, 
Renault guaranteed the maintenance of other components factories in Portugal, and 
will buy the production of Renault factory at Setúbal. Meanwhile, the Portuguese 
government has developed a strategy to sell this 'brownfield' factory to another 
automobile  company  (Japanese,  American  or  South  Korean),  although  this  is 
proving a hard task to achieve. 
None of the 'brownfield' plants have had the equivalent strategic status and 
autonomy of Nissan or Toyota which are their respective company's sole passenger 
car  producing  plants  in  Europe.  'Brownfield'  plants  have  to  compete  between 
'cloned' capacity plants within Europe and often concede concessions, on terms 
and  conditions  of  employment  for  example,  to  'win'  intra-corporate  battles  for 
investment.  The strategic map of European car manufacture is also expanding. 
This has become a key constraint for the 'brownfield' plants located in peripheral 
regions of the EU due to the recent growth of some Central and Eastern countries, 
particularly  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland  (VALE,  1994).  Here,  the 
cost/productivity ratio of manpower is quite positive, the market is developing, the 
workers' skills are adequate, and the quality of the infrastructure is reasonable. 
Even for 'greenfield' investments, the Eastern European countries have attracted 
new projects and have made it more difficult for Spain and Portugal to attract 
inward investment at the international level. 'Brownfield' plants are also integrated 
into supply networks and sourcing strategies which are geared toward volume, 
purchasing  scale  economies  and  efficiency  at  the  corporate  scale.  Design  and 
tooling  costs,  closer  relations  with  fewer  and  larger  suppliers  as  well  as  the 
integration of corporate R&D functions with suppliers have reinforced their lack 
of strategic sourcing, although not operating, autonomy. The existing plants have 
to address the tension between corporate level global sourcing and the desire to 
secure  the  benefits  of  local  JIT  component  supply  at  the  plant  level.  For  the 
'brownfield' plants it is often the purchasing economies of scale and links between 
the R&D centers of the assembler and major suppliers that dictate the geographies 
of supply lines. 
Recent  changes  appear  to  have  reached  the  technical  limits  of  possible 
improvements in production layout and organisation in the 'brownfield' plants. It 
seems that only a more holistic and integrated approach to change, including the 
design  and  ease  of  manufacture  of  the  automobiles,  may  further  improve 
performance. Overall, it seems that all-round improvement is required, not simply 
the  intensification  of  work,  sweating  the  productive  assets  and  attempting  to 
increase productivity by assembling poorly designed products within inefficiently 
laid-out plants at faster rates. However, such regressive strategies appear all too 
often  to  be  the  manifestation  of  'lean'  production  in  'brownfield'  plants  (see 
MORGAN et al., 1992; WILLIAMS et al., 1992). Together, the limits and structural 
barriers  appear  to  undermine  the  effectiveness  of  the  reliance  in  the  UK  and 
Portugal's industrial policy on promoting a 'demonstration effect' as the stimulus to 
industrial adjustment and renewal amongst assemblers and the supply industry. 
 
3.2. – Alternative development strategies 
The  evidence  presented  challenges  the  emphasis  of  the  UK  and Portuguese 
industrial  policy  on  'greenfield'  development  strategies  and  the  'demonstration  
effect' on 'brownfield' plants in the automobile industry. Alternative conceptions of 
'brownfield'  development  strategies  –  for  both  maturing  'greenfields'  and  in 
particular existing plants – need to be developed. It is seductive for the UK and 
Portuguese  Governments,  the  European  Commission  and  automobile 
manufacturers to adopt a market-led stance and argue that 'brownfield' plants that 
cannot adjust should be rationalised and closed. However, the implications for 
workers, communities and local economies which depend upon 'brownfield' plants 
in addition to the huge economic cost of scrapping sunk capital reinforce the need 
for alternative development strategies. 
Central  to  possible  alternatives  is  a  conception  of  the  characteristics  of 
'brownfield' plants which see age and experience not as liabilities but as assets. 
The constraints of operating in 'brownfield' plants therefore need not be a complete 
hindrance to development strategies. The alternative seeks to build upon, rather 
than discard, the legacies of workforce skills, training and traditions as well as the 
fixed  capital  investment  embodied  within  the  existing  plants.  In  this  way,  the 
historical development trajectory of the plants, firms and localities are taken into 
account rather than attempting to erase and recreate them anew. The idea that 
'greenfield'  conditions  can  be  established  in  a  'brownfield'  plants  is  rejected, 
especially  since  this  strategy  is  often  accompanied  by  threats  of  plant 
rationalisation and/or closure and new investment and, increasingly, pay deals are 
tied to radical changes in employment terms and conditions. The renewed interest 
in 'brownfield' development strategies has been closely connected to the debate 
about 'hybridisation' and the rejection of Japanese or 'lean' production methods 
(BERGGREN, 1992; GERPISA, 1995; PIKE, 1994). The accumulated experience in 
'brownfield'  plants  is  interpreted  as  fundamental  to  a  'hybridisation'  of  the 
production process. 
Central  to  'hybridisation'  is  the  recognition  that  there  is  not,  unlike  F.  W. 
Taylor's  infamous  claim,  'one  best  way'  of  organising  production  but  many 
different ways – 'multiple rationalities' (SALAIS and STORPER, 1990) – varying 
with employee, plant and locality history as well as technical requirements. The 
aim  of  'lean'  production  to  establish  a  new  universal  management  model  is 
challenged.  BERGGREN  (1992)  argues  that  what  is  required  is  not  'dogmatic 
emulation' of all of its ideas but a 'dynamic synthesis' of the more progressive 
parts,  including  closer  relations  with  suppliers  and  more  integration  between 
design,  engineering  and  production to improve 'manufacturability'. In this way, 
plant  and  locally  specific  'hybrid'  production  strategies  can  be  formulated  that 
work  best  for  that  plant  and  locality.  There  may  be  signs  that  as  competition 
intensifies,  automobile  producers  in  Europe  are  having  to  focus  available 
investment  and  the  need  for  change  on  their  existing  plants.  'Brownfield' 
development strategies have, as a consequence, a role to play in the restructuring 
of automobile production networks in Europe. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper  has  used  evidence  from  the  automobile  industry  in  the  UK  and 
Portugal to argue that the basis for UK and Portuguese industrial policy has been 
misplaced.  The  reliance  on  new  inward  investment  pursuing  'greenfield' 
development  strategies  has  resulted  in  net  job  displacement  amongst  existing 
producers, regional shifts in the number and character of employment, and the 
benefits of such strategies have been revealed as rather ephemeral advantages that 
are reduced with the passage of time. Also, further overcapacity in the UK and in  
Europe is a major result of this industrial policy. Similarly, the reliance on the 
'demonstration effect' of 'greenfield' strategies on 'brownfield' plants has reached 
effective limits and structural barriers to such changes have emerged. In Portugal, 
the  small  size  of  the  sector  is  a  constraint  to  the  development  of  national 
components  suppliers  which  are  a  crucial  target  of  the  industrial  policy.  To 
develop the components sector, industrial policy should not concentrate only on 
the  attraction  of  inward  investment  and  the  lessons  from  the  UK  should  be 
considered in order to avoid future mistakes. A short sighted dash for expansion in 
the sector without consideration of the longer term, strategic issues may prove 
problematic. 
The need for a policy-shift has been established. A move is needed away from 
the  focus  on  the  supply-side  industrial  policy  dependent  on  the  continuous 
attraction of inward investment and its knock-on effects on existing producers. A 
sectorally  specific  and  regionally  sensitive  industrial  policy  for  the  automobile 
industry is required to promote 'hybridisation' based on acknowledging the skills, 
experiences and capital equipment of 'brownfield' plants as assets not liabilities. In 
this way, there may be hope yet for a robust automobile industry within the UK and in 
Portugal. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This paper builds on work supported by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC)  and  by  Junta  Nacional  de  Investigação  Científica  e  Tecnológica  (JNICT, 
PCSH/C/GEO/715/93). It is part of the Automotive Filière Study section of the European 
Commission funded EUropean Network on Innovation and Territory (EUNIT). The usual 
disclaimers, as always, apply. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
BEARDWELL, I. (1992) – The 'new industrial relations'? a review of the debate. Human Re-
source Management Journal, 2(2): 1-7. 
BERGGREN, C. (1992) – The Volvo Experience: Alternatives to Lean Production in the 
Swedish Auto Industry. Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
BEYNON, H. (1984) – Working for Ford. Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
CAITS (1991) – New Union Strategies: Trade Union Responses to New Management Te-
chniques. CAITS and MTUCURC, London and Liverpool. 
COOPERS & LYBRAND DELOITTE (1991) – A Study into the Knock-On Effects of Inward 
Investment in the English Regions. HMSO, London. 
COSTA,  N.;  M.  VALE (1996) – The impact of AutoEuropa in the national and regional 
development in Portugal. EPRU/CEG (forthcoming), Lisboa. 
DICKEN, P. (1992) – Europe 1992 and strategic change in the international automobile in-
dustry. Environment and Planning A, 24: 11-31. 
DONE, K. (1995) – Eyes on the fast lane. Financial Times, 31st January. 
ECONOMISTS ADVISORY GROUP/IWG (1994) – Inward Investment as an Instrument of Re-
gional Industrial Regeneration. Report for the Anglo-German Foundation for the 
Study of the Industrial Society, Anglo-German Foundation, London/Bonn. 
FERRÃO, J.; M. VALE (1995) – Multi-purpose vehicles, a new opportunity for the peri-
phery? Lessons from the Ford\VW project (Portugal). in R. HUDSON; E. SCHAMP  
(Eds.). Towards a New Map of Automobile Production in Europe? New Production 
Concepts and Regional Restructuring, Springer, Berlin. 
FORD  MOTOR  COMPANY  (1992)  –  Information from Ford (Press Release). Ford Motor 
Company Ltd, Brentwood. 
GAMA, R. (1995) – Multinacionais e pequenas empresas no desenvolvimento territorial: o 
exemplo  de  Mangualde.  Actas  do  II  Congresso  de  Geografia  Portuguesa,  APG, 
Lisboa: 385-399. 
GARRINHAS, J. (1996) – A Indústria de Componentes Automóveis: dos ajustamentos estru-
turais a nível global aos processos locais de desenvolvimento industrial, o caso da 
DELPHI Ponte de Sôr. Unpublished Masters Thesis, Departamento de Geografia, 
Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa. 
GERPISA (1995) – Programme international «Emergence de nouveaux modeles industriels, 
1992-1995». GERPISA Reseau International, Universite d'Evry-Val d'Essone, Evry. 
GUERRA, A. (1990) – Formas e Determinantes do Envolvimento Externo das Empresas. 
Internacionalização  da  Indústria  Automóvel  Portuguesa  na  Indústria  Automóvel 
Mundial. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, ISEG, Lisboa. 
GUERRA, A. (1993) – The international involvement of the Portuguese automobile industry. 
in V. C. SIMÕES (ed.). Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of EIBA, vol. I, 
Agir, Lisboa: 83-113. 
HM GOVERNMENT (1994) – Competitiveness – Helping Business to Win. White Paper, Cm 
2563. HMSO, London. 
IMF (1995) – The Industry Recovers: More Jobs? or Longer Hours?. IMF Auto Report 
1995, Automotive Department, International Metalworkers' Federation, Geneva. 
IRS (1993) – The Impact of Japanese Firms on Working and Employment Practices in 
British Manufacturing Industry. Industrial Relations Service, London. 
JONES, P. N.; R. J. NORTH (1991) – Japanese motor industry transplants: The Western Eu-
ropean dimension. Economic Geography, 67: 105-123. 
LIMA, M. P.; L. PIRES; P. ALVES (1995) – Transformações das relações laborais em três 
sectores: os casos das indústrias automóvel, siderúrgica e naval. Análise Social, 30 
(134): 857-879. 
MARSDEN, D.; T. MORRIS; P. WILLMAN; S. WOOD (1985) – The Car Industry: Labour Re-
lations and Industrial Adjustment. Tavistock Publications, London. 
MAYES, D.; Y. OGIWARA (1992) – Transplanting Japanese success in the UK. NIESR Re-
view, 4 (142): 99-105. 
MIE (1991) – The Automobile Industry and the Foreign Investment. MIE, Lisboa. 
MONIZ, A. B. (1993) – Estratégias de empresas transnacionais (TNE) em economias peri-
féricas: o sector automóvel e o projecto Ford/VW em Portugal. in A. B. MONIZ et al 
(ed.). The Spatial Influence of Industrial Development: The Portuguese Case, Pro-
jecto The Future of Industry in Europe, FAST-MONITOR, DG XII, CEG, Lisboa. 
MORGAN, K.; P. COOKE; A. PRICE (1992) – The Challenge of Lean Production for German 
Industry. Regional Industrial Research Report 12, Department of City and Regional 
Planning, University of Wales College of Cardiff. 
MUNDAY, M.; J. MORRIS; B. WILKINSON (1995) – Factories or warehouses? a Welsh pers-
pective on Japanese transplant manufacturing. Regional Studies, 29 (1): 1-17. 
OLIVER, N.; B. WILKINSON (1990) – Contemporary industrial change: the implications of 
the 'Japanization' of British industry. in S. CROWTHER; P. GARRAHAN; P. STEWART 
(eds.). Restructuring for Economic Flexibility. Avebury, Aldershot. 
OLIVER, N.; R. DELBRIDGE; J. LOWE (1993) – World Class Manufacturing: Further Evidence in 
the Lean Production Debate. University of Cambridge, Cambridge. Mimeo.  
PA CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC CONSULTANCY (1995) – Assessment of the Wider Effects of 
Foreign Investment on Manufacturing in the UK. PA Cambridge Economic Consult-
ancy, Cambridge. 
PIKE, A. (1994) – 'New' Activities for 'Old Industrial Spaces'?: Restructuring the Global 
Automobile Industry and the Old Industrial Regions of the UK. Unpublished Ph. D 
Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Liverpool, Liverpool. 
POLLERT, A. (1992) (ed.) – Farewell to Flexibility?. Unwin Hyman, London. 
RUIGROK, W.; R. VAN TULDER; G. BAVEN (1991) – Cars and Complexes: Globalisation 
versus Global Localization Strategies in the World Car Industry. Prospective Dos-
sier 2, Volume 13, MONITOR/FAST Programme, DGXII, CEC, Brussels. 
SADLER, D. (1993) – National and international regulatory frameworks: the politics of Eu-
ropean  automobile  industry  production  and  trade.  in  R.  HUDSON;  E.  SCHAMP 
(eds.). Towards a New Map of Automobile Production in Europe? New Production 
Concepts and Regional Restructuring, Springer, Berlin. 
SALAIS,  R.;  M.  STORPER (1990) – One Industry, Multiple Rationalities: Flexibility and 
Mass Production in the French Automobile Industry. Discussion Paper D901, Gra-
duate  School  of  Architecture  and  Urban  Planning,  University  of  California,  Los 
Angeles. 
SMMT (1989) – SMMT Guide to Motor Manufacturing in Britain. SMMT, London. 
TOMANEY, J. (1991) – Japanese Inward Investment and Regional Development. Paper for 
CLES Conference 'Japanese Inward Investment in the UK', Matlock, 31st January. 
VALE, M. (1994) – Restructuring the automobile industry and the Southern and Eastern 
European regions. Regional Conference of IGU, Prague, CEG, EPRU 41: 51-64. 
WILLIAMS, K.; C. HASLAM; J. WILLIAMS (1992) – Against lean production. Economy and 
Society, 21 (3): 321-354. 
WILLIAMS,  K.;  C.  HASLAM;  S.  JOHAL;  J.  WILLIAMS  (1994)  –  Cars:  Analysis,  History, 
Cases. Berghahn Books, Oxford. 
WOMACK, J.; D. JONES; D. ROOS (1990) – The Machine That Changed the World. Maxwell 
Macmillan International, New York. 
WOOD, S. (1992) – Debating Japanese Management: Post-Fordism or the Japanization of 
Fordism. Industrial Relations Department, London School of Economics, London. 
Mimeo. 
 